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AMBRO, Circuit Judge1 
 
Former federal inmate Jesse Simpson seeks money damages against federal officials 
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971).  He alleges that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment’s bar against 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The Court extends its gratitude to Appellee’s pro bono counsel for their extraordinary 
efforts during this appellate proceeding.   
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cruel and unusual punishment by denying his request to eat meals outside the prison dining 
hall despite the anxiety attacks attending his in-hall dining.  The District Court denied 
defendants’ motion to dismiss,2 holding that Simpson’s allegations, if proven, would justify 
a Bivens remedy.  They appeal.  Because we agree with defendants that Simpson does not 
have a Bivens claim, we reverse.3    
I. 
Prior to his incarceration, Simpson was diagnosed with social anxiety disorder and 
Asperger’s syndrome.  He tried twice to eat in the prison dining hall.  Both times he 
suffered “severe panic attacks due to the extreme close proximity of other aggressive 
inmates while eating.”  App. 40.  He attributes those attacks to his mental conditions.   
Simpson discussed his anxiety issues with medical officers, who increased the 
dosage of his anxiety medicine and prescribed him additional medication.  Dissatisfied 
with this treatment, Simpson informed defendant Paul Horning, the prison’s Food Service 
Administrator, of his anxiety issues.  He proposed eating with the dining hall staff before 
other inmates received their meals or eating outside the dining hall.  Horning denied both 
requests.   
So Simpson escalated his request for accommodation.  In response, Horning told 
 
2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(1), the parties consented to have this case heard by a 
magistrate judge.   
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral order doctrine, which allows us to review an 
interlocutory order where, as here, the defendants have been denied a qualified immunity 
defense and challenge “whether a damages remedy under Bivens exists.”  Mack v. Yost, 
968 F.3d 311, 318 (3d Cir. 2020).  Our review is plenary, and we “accept plaintiff’s 
allegations as true and draw all inferences in his or her favor.”  George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 
562, 571 (3d Cir. 2013).   
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him it would be unsanitary to take food outside the dining hall and that he would get the 
same response from higher-ups.  He later gave Simpson a written response: 
It is not allowed within Food Service Policy, Program 
Statement 4700.06, Food Service Manual, to allow for 
potentially hazardous foods to be served and removed from the 
dining room.  There are no locations outside of the dining room 
where meals can be consumed within policy.  Also, your 
request has been discussed with your medical and mental 
health providers, and being allowed to take food out of the 
Dining Hall is not deemed clinically necessary.   
  
App. 80.  But Simpson alleges that some inmates—for instance, those with certain medical 
or religious restrictions—are allowed to eat meals outside the dining hall.   
Unable to eat with the other inmates, Simpson began eating solely out of the prison 
commissary.  His health suffered due to the poor commissary selection and his dietary 
restrictions.  He has since been released to home confinement but pursues an Eighth 
Amendment damages claim premised on prison officials’ refusal to provide him necessary 
accommodations to eat prison meals.4   
II. 
In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures allows a federal cause of action for 
money damages despite the absence of any statute authorizing such a remedy.  Bivens, 403 
U.S. at 397.  Since then the Court has implied a damages remedy for only a handful of 
other constitutional violations.  See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854–55 (2017) 
(citing cases).  It has more recently been explicit in its distaste for further Bivens expansion, 
 
4 Whether Simpson exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to this claim 
remains at issue.  For purposes of this appeal, we assume his claims are exhausted.    
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noting that “[i]n most instances . . . the Legislature is in the better position to consider if 
the public interest would be served by imposing a new substantive legal liability.”  Id. at 
1857 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
Thus in Abbasi the Court “established a rigorous inquiry” to determine whether 
Bivens coverage is available.  Bistrian v. Levi, 912 F.3d 79, 89 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 
Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 2017)).  First, we assess whether 
the plaintiff’s case presents a “new context,” that is, whether it differs “in a meaningful 
way from previous Bivens cases decided by” the Supreme Court.  Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 
1864.  If not, a damages remedy is available.  But if so, we go to the second step and 
consider “whether there were alternative remedies or other sound reasons to think Congress 
might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy in a suit like this one.”  Id. at 
1865 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
Simpson urges us to stop at step one, arguing that his claim falls within the Bivens 
context established in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).  We disagree.  Though 
Simpson too invokes the Eighth Amendment in the prison setting, that is not dispositive.  
See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020).  His claim regarding prison officials’ 
failure to except him from a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) food-service policy requiring prison 
meals to be served in the dining hall bears little resemblance to Carlson, which involved 
prison officials’ woeful lack of medical treatment for an inmate’s asthma, resulting in his 
death.  Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16 n.1; see Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1864 (“[E]ven a modest 
extension [of Bivens] is still an extension.”).  Indeed, unlike the Carlson plaintiff, Simpson 
alleges he was provided treatment for his anxiety on several occasions.   
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So we move to step two and ask whether “special factors counsel[] hesitation” in 
extending a damages remedy to Simpson’s claim.  Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Two such factors—the existence of alternative remedies and 
separation-of-powers concerns—counsel against expanding Bivens here.  See id. at 1848.  
Simpson had access to alternative methods of relief, including the BOP’s administrative 
remedy program and a suit for injunctive relief.  See Mack, 968 F.3d at 320 (an alternative 
remedy “need not provide an individual with complete relief in order to foreclose a 
damages remedy under Bivens”).  Though he argues that only damages could remedy his 
injury, his is not the sort of case we have characterized as “damages or nothing.”  See, e.g., 
Bistrian, 912 F.3d at 84 (permitting a damages remedy where prison officials allowed an 
inmate to be brutally beaten by other inmates despite knowing of the threats against him, 
causing the inmate to suffer “severe physical and psychological injuries”).  Moreover, 
Simpson’s criticism of prison officials’ interpretation and application of a BOP food-
service policy “calls in question broad policies pertaining to the reasoning [and] manner” 
of prison operations, risking “encroach[ment] on the executive’s domain.”  See id. at 94–
95; see also id. (“[T]he task of prison administration ‘has been committed to the 
responsibility of the [legislative and executive] branches, and separation-of-powers 
concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987))).        
Because special factors counsel against extending a damages remedy to this new 
7 
 
Bivens context,5 we reverse and remand for the District Court to dismiss Simpson’s Eighth 
Amendment damages claim.   
 
5 The District Court also held that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.  
Because we reverse on the Bivens issue, we do not address this ruling.   
